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Formålet med notatet er å utvikle en normative model for prising av 
gasstransport.  Modellen tar utgangspunkt i nyere reguleringsteorier, der 
kontrakten mellom en regulator og en bedrift er preget av 
informasjonsasymmetri og kan beskrives v.h.a. prinsipal-agent modeller.  
Innledningsvis beskriver jeg gassmarkedet og behovet for regulering.  Deretter 
utleder jeg en normativ prismodell. Til slutt evaluerer jeg ECP-regelen mot min 
normative modell.  
SUMMARY 
 
 
This paper discusses access pricing for a natural gas pipeline.  In doing so, I 
use the new economics of regulation which is an application of the principal-
agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and 
regulated firms.  After presenting the regulatory context, I develop a normative 
model for regulating the access prices to a natural gas pipeline in the presence 
of competition in the retail market for natural gas.  Finally I compare the 
Efficient Component Pricing rule with my normative pricing model . 
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Preface 
 
This paper discusses access pricing for a natural gas pipeline.  In doing so, I use the new 
economics of regulation which is an application of the principal-agent methodology to the 
contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms.  After presenting the 
regulatory context, I develop a normative model for regulating the access prices to a natural 
gas pipeline in the presence of competition in the retail market for natural gas.  Finally, I 
compare the Efficient Component Pricing Rule with my normative pricing model . 
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Norway has rich supplies of crude oil, gas and waterfalls.  Hydropower is the 
main energy source for stationary energy consumption, while natural gas 
accounts for only 1% of our stationary energy consumption.  Recently, there 
has been a political pressure towards increased domestic use of natural gas.  
This implies developing an infrastructure for natural gas in some areas of 
Norway that will supplement the well developed infrastructure for electricity.  
The resulting market for transmission or distribution of natural gas will most 
likely be one of imperfect competition.  Imperfect competition can lead to an 
efficiency loss and there might be a role for government intervention in terms 
of regulation or competition policy.   
 
This paper discusses access pricing for a natural gas pipeline.  In doing so, I 
use the new economics of regulation1 which is an application of the principal-
agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and 
regulated firms.  In section 1 I present the regulatory context.  In section 2 I 
develop a normative model for regulating the access prices to a natural gas 
pipeline in the presence of competition in the retail market for natural gas.  In 
section 3 the relationship between the optimal model and a simple and 
influential pricing rule; The Efficient Component Pricing Rule, is investigated. 
I conclude the paper in section 4 by discussing the limits of the current 
approach and presenting directions for my further research. 
 
 
1 The regulatory context  
1.1 Theory and concepts 
Regulation can be defined as the government intervention in some specific 
markets in response to normative objectives and triggered by the existence of 
market failure.  Investing in natural gas pipelines, market failure can occur due 
to; 
1. a cost structure characterized as a natural monopoly, 
2. large sunk costs that give rise to the hold-up problem and 
                                                
1 The term “new economics of regulation” was first used by Jean-Jacques Laffont in his 
Presidential Address to the Econometric Society in 1994 (Laffont J-J (1994). 
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3. informational asymmetry between agents in the market. 
 
A production activity is a natural monopoly for a certain production quantity if 
this quantity can be produced cheaper by one single producer than by any other 
organization of the production.  The standard solution to this problem is to give 
the right to supply to one firm.  This firm must produce the socially optimal 
quantity of the good, and is compensated for the loss of doing so.   
 
Large, irreversible investments can give rise to opportunistic behaviour. Faced 
with one customer, the investor might be forced to sell its services at a price 
which only reflects the avoidable costs.  Furthermore, a regulator unable to 
commit his actions fully in advance, may find it optimal to alter price control 
ex post after the regulated firm has sunk its investment.  Knowing this, socially 
beneficially investments might not be undertaken in the first place, and there 
would be a hold-up problem. In the case of symmetric information, this could 
be solved by designing complete contracts that specified the terms of trade in 
every state of nature that could occur.  However, even in the case of symmetric 
information, incomplete regulatory contracts and  the inability of the regulator 
to commit itself into the future represents a constraint on the relationship 
between the regulator and the firm. 
 
Finally, information asymmetry where the firm has private information about 
its technology, demand and/or effort might give rise to strategic behaviour in 
the firm and complicate the design of an optimal regulation.  The informational 
asymmetry represents informational constraints on the design of an optimal 
regulatory policy.  Private knowledge of exogenous variables like productivity 
or demand leads to problems of adverse selection, while private knowledge of 
endogenous variables such as cost reducing effort leads to problem of moral 
hazard.    
 
There exist at least four approaches to the regulatory problem above: 
1. regulate the market participant’s choice variables, like price and 
quality2, 
                                                
2  Examples are rate of return regulation, revenue cap regulation or price cap regulation. 
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2. define contracts which specify the rights and duties of the participants 
in the natural gas network, 
3. regulate by harnessing the competitive forces and 
4. control ex post. 
 
In this paper I will focus on the first approach and develop a model for 
regulating the access price of a natural gas network under the assumption of 
information asymmetry.   
 
 
1.2 Regulating a natural gas network  
Gas from the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS)  is a blend of wet gas and 
dry gas.  Dry gas is commonly called natural gas and consists mainly of metan 
( 4CH ).  Natural gas has many characteristics that makes it preferable to other 
energy carriers like: flexibility in use and storage, high energy efficiency in 
power production and low omissions of polluting gases.   
 
The value chains for natural gas can be divided into four steps: production, 
transmission, distribution and end use. 
 
Production: Here the gas owner or licensee is the producer who extracts the 
gas from the ground.   
 
Transmission:  The transmitter or shipper transports gas in bulk through a 
transmission infrastructure from the area of production to the area of 
consumption.  The infrastructure can consist of pipelines, tank lorries or ships. 
  
Distribution:  The distributor distributes gas from the connection point with the 
transmission infrastructure to the final consumers.  Power plant and large 
industrial users of natural gas may bypass the distribution company and buy 
directly from a transmission company.   
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End use:  The consumer is the final user of natural gas.  The end user may be  
households, commercial consumers, large industrial users or power plants.  A 
retail supplier of gas has to purchase it from the gas producers, move it through 
the transmission and distribution networks and sell it to final customers3.   
 
Figure 1 illustrates that transportation of natural gas can be done in different 
ways: as gas in pipelines, in liquid form (LNG) by tank lorries or ships or as 
compressed gas (CNG) by tankers or by pipelines.  Figure 2 outlines the value 
chain for natural gas when the gas is transmitted in  pipelines. 
 
My focus in this paper is on regulation of the natural gas in pipelines.  The 
existence of parallel transmission/distribution alternatives should however be 
taken into consideration when designing the optimal regulatory policy for 
natural gas pipelines. 
 
The suppliers are the licensees of a gas field on the NCS represented by the 
operator.  Once extracted, the gas is transmitted to one of three beachheads; 
Kollsnes, Kårstø and Tjeldbergodden4.   Statoil is the major supplier of gas 
from the NCS; other important licensees are Hydro, Esso, Gaz de France, 
Conoco/Phillips, Shell and TotalFinaElf.  Statoil is selling gas on all 
beachheads in Norway.  It has been central in supplying gas to the distribution 
companies in Haugalandet and Bergen.  Recently Shell has entered most new 
contracts with Norwegian gas distribution companies like Gasnor and Lyse 
Gass.  In addition to Gasnor and Lyse Gass, many new regional distribution 
companies have been established like; Naturgass Trøndelag, Naturgass 
Grenland, Sogn og Fjordane Energi Gass, Naturgass Sør and Naturgass Møre.  
The technical solutions vary, some plan to invest in gas pipelines while most 
invest in infrastructure for LNG/CNG.     
 
                                                
3 Note that the demand for gas is seasonal and stochastic.  Thus any gas supplier needs 
mechanisms for coping with such demand variability.  The gas can be stored in the gas field or 
in temporary storage facilities close to the market.  An alternative is demand management.  
Prices can be set to dampen the variations in demand and/or the suppliers can offer contracts 
where the customers are prepared to have their supplies interrupted on peak demand days.  
4  Melkøya is a beachhead for LNG.  Furthermore, there will be a new beachhead for natural 
gas at Aukra. 
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Figure 1 
Different transmission solutions for natural gas 
 
 
Figure 2 
Value chain NG – transmission in pipelines 
Production Transmission Distribution End-use
Producers Transmitters Distributors Households
Owners Shippers Commercial 
Licensees consumers
Industrial
users
Power plants
Competition CompetitionNatural monopolies: Regulation  
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The value chain is at present highly vertically integrated.  One example is Lyse 
Gass which buys gas from one of the operators, transports it through its own 
pipeline from Kårstø to Risvika and distributes the gas to its own customers.  
Another example is Gasnor which buys gas at Kollsnes, transforms the gas to 
LNG at its own LNG plant and transports the LNG to its customers on its own 
tankers.  A third example is the establishment of LNG Norge as.  This 
company, which is a subsidiary of Statoil, can become an important supplier of 
LNG in the retail market for natural gas.  
 
While there may be scope for competition in the supplier5 and end user market6 
for natural gas, transmission and distribution of natural gas are often  
characterized as natural monopolies.  The expected life of a natural gas 
pipeline is well over 30 years and the investment required is often very large 
and sunk.  This gives rise to a cost structure of falling unit cost in the 
transmitting industry (see figure 3).   The transmission unit cost, calculated 
taking into account both investments and operating costs, is highly dependent 
on the utilization of the capacity in the pipeline.  As a result, there is a case 
against allowing horizontal competition, although there might be an argument 
for allowing entrants to build new pipelines serving new customers7.  
 
Furthermore hold-up problems may lead to investment levels in natural gas 
pipelines below what is socially optimal.  Both producers of natural gas, 
transmission and distribution companies and end user customers must 
undertake investments which are irreversible.  This can lead to opportunistic 
behaviour by all participants.  A producer of natural gas can f.ex. threat to 
delay the development of a gas field.  If the threat is perceived as convincing, 
                                                
5  Production is not naturally monopolistic.  The marginal cost of extracted gas can be expected 
to rise over time because the most accessible fields are developed first.  Once extracted, the gas 
is transmitted to the beachhead.   
 
6 Having access to the transportation network (or access to tankers if LNG/CNG) means that 
the supply of gas to final customers is potentially highly competitive.  Sunk costs in supply are 
small.  The main assets are working capital and contracts with producers and customers that 
can be resold.   
7 A change in technology or rapid rise in demand might also make horizontal competition in 
transportation socially optimal. 
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the transmission company’s best strategy can be to offer access unit charges 
which do not cover total costs including both investments and operating costs. 
 
Figure 3 
Estimated unit costs for natural gas pipelines from Kårstø to Grenland.   
Source:  St.meld. nr. 47 (2003-2004). 
 
 
 
 
The problem of hold-up has in many countries been met by designing long-
term “take-or-pay” contracts.  The contract specifies that the producer or 
“shipper” must pay for his share of the capacity in the pipeline, whether he 
uses it or not.  The tariff can be set equal to the average unit cost of the 
pipeline.  However, if the producer/”shipper” cannot monitor the costs of 
operating the pipeline, the transmission company will have an incentive to 
claim that their costs are higher or their capacity utilization is lower than it 
actually is.  Therefore a regulator is often given the authority to determine both 
the capacity charge and the variable costs due to transmission.  The regulator 
must also approve the service contract and further network 
expansions/reductions.8  
                                                
8 The NEB Act (Canada) and the Natural Gas Act (USA) give no clear guiding rules as to how 
the transmission tariffs shall be determined, only that they shall be ”reasonable and not 
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The hold-up problem is a result of the participants not having any outside 
opportunity.  If however a producer of natural gas can transform the gas to 
liquid form, the market power of the transmission company will be reduced.  
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is natural gas which is made liquid by lowering 
the temperature.   The liquid gas can be stored and transported on a tank, and 
be transported by lorry, ship or train.  LNG also offers distribution solutions 
with greater flexibility than pipelines, because one can alter the points for 
loading and unloading and because there is a second hand market for tank 
lorries, ships or storage tanks.  A value chain for LNG consists of a production 
plant (inclusive shipping terminal), transporting units (ships, tank lorries, 
containers etc), terminals and installation for redistribution in tankers or low 
pressure pipelines.  Also transforming natural gas to Compressed Natural Gas 
(CNG) represents an alternative to the producer.  CNG is natural gas which is 
transported and stored under high pressure.  CNG has many of the same merits 
as LNG.  The market share of CNG is however much smaller than natural gas 
in pipelines and LNG.  The cost structure of the three transportation 
alternatives are compared in figure 4.  The relatively flat unit costs curves for 
LNG and CNG implies that investment in LNG/CNG infrastructure is not 
subject to economies of scale.  There is no clear motive for regulating the  
income from the related infrastructure.   
 
The choice of transportation alternative will depend on market size and 
transport distance.   Investment in pipelines can be profitable compared to 
investment in infrastructure for LNG or CNG when volumes are high and/or 
transported distances are relatively small.  In densely populated areas in Europe 
and in the US, transmission of gas is mainly through pipelines.  Recently, there 
has been an increased interest in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) worldwide.  
According to St.meld. nr. 47 (2003-2004) Norway might experience a gradual 
development of domestic use of natural gas where LNG will be sold in an early 
                                                                                                                            
discriminatory”.  The regulators in both countries has however practised a cost of service 
regulation.  Recently there has been an increased interest for, and use of, regulatory policies 
that are designed to give a higher incentive for cost reduction.  An example is price cap 
regulation 
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phase, while natural gas in pipelines will be sold if and when the market 
develops.    
 
Figure 4 
Transmission costs for natural gas in pipelines (“tørrgassrør”), LNG and CNG. 
Source:  St.meld. nr. 47 (2003-2004). 
 
 
In this paper I will focus on the regulation of income from transmission of gas 
in pipelines.  I will take a partial perspective where I don’t include the effects 
of competition between the various forms of natural gas.9  I hope to broaden 
this perspective in my later work.   
 
 
2 The normative model 
2.1 Introduction 
The value chain for natural gas includes networks with a cost structure 
characterized as natural monopoly.  However, many activities which use the 
network as an output and input are potentially competitive (sale of gas from the 
producers, distribution of gas to end customer and generation of electricity).  A 
central issue is therefore to combine the necessary regulation of the network 
with the organization of competition in those activities. 
 
                                                
9 Also, I don’t include competition with other energy carriers that produce the same services 
for the end users.  One example is the service heat.  Electricity, different oil products and wet 
gas can provide the same service.  They can be treated as close substitutes to natural gas in this 
respect. 
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The problems facing the Regulator can be  visualized in figure 5 below.  A 
monopolist owns the gas network.   A group of small competitors sells natural 
gas in the retail market. I assume that the competitors are dependent on access 
to the gas network if they are to supply natural gas to their customers.  
Furthermore, I assume that the competitors provide the same good and that 
competition means that prices are reduced to their marginal costs.  The central 
issue is on what terms should the competitive firms be given access to the 
monopolist network?  The solution to this problem will depend on whether the 
monopolist has access to the competitive end user market and on whether the 
prices set by the regulator and/or the competitive fringe in this market is 
regulated.   
 
Figure 5 
Access pricing and competition in the retail market 
Terms of access?
Permitted to operate?
Regulated?
Regulated?
Monopolist
End user market for natural gas.
Competitive.
Competitors
 
 
When it comes to vertical integration two different types of policies can be 
observed: 1) divestiture and 2) defining access charges and letting the 
monopoly compete.  An example of the first policy is found in the USA 
telephone industry where the local network monopolies have been prevented 
from entering the value added markets as well as the long distance market 
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because of the Department of Justice’s belief that it is impossible to define 
access rules to network which create fair competition in those markets. 10 In 
this paper however, I will concentrate on the current situation for the  
Norwegian gas industry where a gas company like Lyse Gass is allowed both 
to invest and operate a gas pipeline and be involved in other and competitive 
parts of the gas value chain.  The regulatory issues are then reduced to setting 
the access prices and perhaps regulate the monopolist price in the retail market. 
 
An overview of access pricing theory is given by Armstrong and Sappington 
(2003).  Their presentation is however based upon an assumption of symmetric 
information.  Laffont and Tirole (1994) develop a model for common network 
assuming asymmetric information11. They use the telecommunication sector as 
an example, but their model is general.  With minor modifications, I have used 
their model to illustrate how optimal access prices could be derived for a 
natural gas network.  
 
2.2 The assumptions 
The model consists of a dominant firm which operates a network and sells 
natural gas (good 1) in the end user market and an unregulated competitive 
fringe which also sells natural gas (good 2) in the end user market.  Good 1 and 
good 2 are close12 substitutes.  The competitive fringe requires access to the 
network (good 0) in order to reach their customers. 
 
The dominant firms activities are split into two; the activities characterized by 
a natural monopolistic cost structure and the activities which are not..  The first 
group of activities are related to operating the network.  The second group of 
activities comprise all activities that are potentially competitive.  Examples are:  
negotiating and purchasing natural gas from the producers and entering new 
contracts with final customers.  The cost structure is divided into two to reflect 
                                                
10 This example is from J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1994).   
11 See also J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1994), chapter 5. 
12 The quality of the goods sold are equal.  The terms of the contract may however differ, and 
the customer may therefore view the goods as close but not perfect substitutes. 
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this division.  I assume that the manager can exert cost reducing effort in both 
the monopolistic and the competitive part.  
 
The basic assumptions of the model: 
 
1. The model is static.  The regulator acts like a Stackelberg leader and 
designs first the contract which the firms then react to.    
 
2. The cost functions are given by:  
,,, 000 ˜
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+-+
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222 aqcqC +=  competitive fringe producing good 2 
where 21 qqQ +=  is the level of network activity, β is a 
productivity parameter and ie  are levels of nonmonetary effort.  
 
3. Regulation is subject to adverse selection β and moral hazard e. 
The regulator knows however: 
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4. 212110 ,,,,,,, pandpaqqQcCC  are observable to the regulator.  
The regulator also knows the demand schedule of the three 
products. 
 
5. The regulated firm and the competitive fringe’s utility is given by 
the equations below. The regulated firm requires a nonnegative 
utility to sign a contract with the regulator.  Competition will drive 
prices set by the competitive fringe down to its marginal costs. 
Because of constant marginal costs the fringe makes no profit, and 
therefore the social value of its profit is irrelevant.  
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6. The benevolent regulator acts as to maximize the total surplus of the 
consumers,  the taxpayers and the firms: 
( )
( )( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]
( )
[ ]1,0~
00,,
:
~1
1
,
21
22210
1110
221121
=Ÿ=
<¢¢>¢
--++++-
+-+++-
--
ttll
ly
l
SSqqS
where
qacpaqeet
qpCCt
qpqpqqS
 
 
7. Other assumptions are: 
• The regulator and the firms are risk neutral w.r.t. income.   
• The regulator can give the regulated firm a monetary transfer; t.   
The regulator faces a shadow cost of public funds; λ.   
• The regulator reimburses costs, receives directly the revenue 
from the sale of good 1 and pays a net transfer to the regulated 
firm.  The regulated firm receives the access charges directly. 
 
Some of the assumptions made are worth commenting: 
 
The original model in the paper by J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1994) includes 
good 0 both as an input to the production of good 1 and 2 and as a final 
monopoly good that can be sold in the end user market.13  That does not seem 
suitable in the application of their model to the gas market.  Furthermore, 
Laffont and Tirole assumes that  all three prices are regulated.  In contrast, I 
                                                
13 In equation (1) Q is then 210 qqqQ ++=  and equation (6) is altered to 
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~
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assume that 1p  and a are regulated, while 2p  is not.  My model yields the 
same result, however, because the competitive fringe is assumed to be a price 
taker and faces a constant marginal cost. 
 
The model assumes that the regulator sets both the access charge and the price 
level of the regulated firm.  Arguing that the final market is potentially 
competitive, an alternative case could be to only regulate access prices. 
  
I have assumed that the costs of operating the network and producing good 1 
are separately observable.  The realism of this assumption for the Norwegian 
gas market will have to be investigated before I go on refining the model.  
However, Laffont and Tirole (1994) investigate some conditions under which 
the observability of the sub cost functions is not necessary to develop a 
normative pricing rule.      
 
The constant14 marginal cost of producing good 2 is assumed known, which 
means that I refrain from analyzing incentive issues in the competitive fringe.  
If, in addition, the technologies of the dominant firm and the competitive fringe 
were correlated, the regulator could learn from the quantities traded 
information not contained in the regulated firm’s choice of prices.  If I want to 
study access pricing under asymmetric information, I must therefore assume 
that the technologies are not related.   This does not seem to fit well with 
reality. 
 
In this model the total cost of the competitive fringe varies linearly with the 
access unit charge a.  This indirectly implies that the competitive fringe has no 
outside opportunity to use the network as an input15.  The existence of LNG 
and CNG, might question the realism in this assumption.   
 
                                                
14 If we instead assumed a strictly convex cost function, the competitive fringe would make a 
positive profit.  The social value of this profit would have an effect on the access price (see 
equation 5.12 and 5.13 in Laffont and Tirole (1993)) 
15 If such an alternative existed, we might have assumed a concave cost function where 
.0/2 <∂∂ aC  
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Finally I have assumed that the regulated firm’s unit cost of producing the 
network services demanded by the competitors is the same as that of producing 
the network services for internal consumption.  An important feature of this 
model is then that the regulated firm cannot claim that the production of the 
intermediate good is costly in order to hurt its competitors without making a 
case against the production of its own final good.  This might be a reasonable 
assumption as long as monopolists like Lyse Gass has spare capacity in their 
pipelines, and do not have to invest in expansions.   
 
I have made the classical monotone hazard rate assumption.  This is done to 
make sure that the first and second order condition for truth telling are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimum for concave welfare functions. 
 
2.3 Information symmetry – the benchmark result 
Under complete information a utilitarian regulator maximises the surplus of the 
consumers, taxpayers and the firms subject to the monopoly’s individual 
rationality constraint and the competitive pricing behaviour of the fringe.  
Below I have set up the optimisation problem substituting away t . 
  
Figure 6 
Optimization Program I: Symmetric Information 
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In a situation with complete information the individual rationality constraint 
will bind.  Since public funds are costly, U should be set equal to zero.  
Furthermore, competition forces the prices on good 2 down to its marginal cost 
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and the price on good 2 will equal  ca + . Substituting for U and a, the 
optimisation problem can be reformulated: 
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Assuming concave S and 10 CandC convex in ( )Qqee ,,, ,110 , the optimal 
regulation is characterized by the following four first order conditions (see 
appendix A): 
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As a consequence the access unit charge is given by the following formula:  
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The regulator should set prices in the regulated firm according to 01 LandL .  
Competition will secure prices on the unregulated good according to 2L . 
 
Both the access unit charge and the price on good 1 are higher than the 
marginal costs of providing the goods.  This is because deficits are socially 
costly16.  Observing an external transfer price (a) in excess of the internal 
transfer price ( QC0 ), is no evidence that the regulated firm has too much 
incentive to weaken competition, since this pricing formula has to hold even in 
the case where the regulator has full information about the firm.   
 
Note in particular that the access price and the price level of the substitute 
goods exceeds not only the marginal cost of providing access but also the 
traditional Ramsey price ( ) ihll +1/  associated with good i’s elasticity of 
demand.  The key to understand this result is to view the access good and good 
1 as substitutes.  An increase in 1p  not only decreases the demand for good 1, 
it also raises the demand for good 2.  The increased demand for good 2 raises 
the demand for the access good by an equal amount.  A unit increase in 2q  
therefore implies a gain of revenue from the network for the regulated firm.  
This dampening effect is included in the super elasticity for good 1 which is 
lower than good 1’s elasticity of demand.       
 
Finally, note that an alternative regulatory policy is to set an access charge 
equal to the marginal costs and levy a tax on good 2: 
 
2
2
0 ˆ1 hl
l ptaxCa Q +
=Ÿ=  
 
2.4 Information asymmetry – incentive issues 
In the case of information asymmetry the regulator must design a mechanism  
G  which consists of a strategy set for the agent, as well as an outcome function 
() ()( )⋅=GÆ⋅ gSXSg ,.: .   
                                                
16 If the deficit of the regulated firm could be financed by a lump sum tax, all prices would 
equal marginal costs. 
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According to the revelation principle, a necessary condition for a general 
mechanism to implement the social choice function is that it can be replaced by 
a direct mechanism where the firms are asked to announce their true type.   
 
The regulator offers a direct mechanism to the regulated firm 
 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )bbbbbbbb ~,~,~,~,~,~,, 110 aQqCCt=G .   
 
The firm announces its type; bˆ .  The firm will then receive a net transfer ( )bˆt  
and is instructed to produce ( )bˆ1q and transport ( )b~Q  at the sub costs 
( ) ( )bb ˆˆ 10 CandC  and charge an access unit price ( )bˆa . 
 
We proceed to find under what conditions the firm will have as its equilibrium 
strategy to participate and truthfully reveal its identity. Let ( )QCE ,, 00 b  be the 
solution  in 0e  of ( )QeC ,, 00 b  and let ( )111 ,, qCE b  be the solution  in 1e  of 
( )111 ,, qeC b , we can rewrite the objective function of the regulated firm as a 
function of the announced and the true productivity type 
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )bbbbbbybbbbb ~,~,~,~,~~~ˆ, 111002 qCEQCEqatU +-+=  
 
According to the revelation principle , the first order condition for the firm’s 
maximisation problem should be satisfied when evaluated at bb =~ . 
 
( ) ( ) bbb
b
bb
bb
"==
∂
∂
=
0,~
~,
2
~
UU  
 
Let ( ) ( )bbb UU ≡, , we can replace this first order condition by 
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Since this expression is decreasing in beta and the utility is socially costly, the 
individual rationality constraint for the monopoly becomes 
 
( ) 0=bU .      
 
Neglecting the second order condition (see appendix C), the regulator’s 
optimisation program is given in figure 7: 
 
Figure 7 
Optimisation program II: Asymmetric information 
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I solve the optimisation problem using control theory (see appendix B).  The 
resulting control variables are dependent on type and are given by equation (3) 
– (6).  
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The optimal access charge is then 
 (7) 
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Under asymmetric information, all prices are modified by an incentive 
correction term.  Analysing this term I note: 
 
• There is no correction term for the most efficient type because ( )bF =0.  
The correction terms for other types will depend on the sub cost 
functions. 
 
• All prices depend on the sub cost function operating the network, while 
the price on the monopoly good also depends on the sub cost function 
producing good 1. 
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• The terms 
0000
// eCCE bb -=∂∂ and 1111 // eCCE bb -=∂∂ is central in 
the incentive correction term.  This is the rate at which the monopoly 
must substitute effort for loss of productivity to keep the same level of 
cost.  Note that if QE ∂∂∂ b/0
2  and 11
2 / qE ∂∂∂ b  are positive, an 
increase in the production of the goods raises monopoly’s utility; 
( ) ( )( ) bbbyb
b
b
dEEU Ú ∂∂+∂∂¢= // 10 .  Since the monopoly’s utility 
is socially costly, the regulator will try to reduce the quantities 
produced.  This can be achieved by raising the prices.  To find the sign 
of the incentive correction term, we investigate what happens to these 
two terms as total output increases   
 
o If ( )( ) ( )( )111110000 ,,,, qeCCQeCC bVbV =Ÿ= , the 
incentive correction terms disappear.  This is the famous 
dichotomy condition, under which prices do not serve any 
incentive purpose under asymmetric information. 
 
o Under more general cost functions, the effect of the incentive 
correction term is ambiguous.  Assuming the “Spence-Mirrlees” 
condition on cost; 
110
0 qQ CandC bb > , and assuming that 
increased effort decreases the marginal cost, the sign of the 
nominator of 
iieii
CCE // bb -=∂∂  is undetermined. 
 
Under asymmetric information the optimal access price and the optimal price 
of good 1 can be both higher and lower than under symmetric information.  
This will depend on the sub cost functions of the regulated firm.  With the 
assumption of common network, the regulated firm will have limited gains 
from exaggerating the marginal costs of giving access to competitors.  As a 
result the marginal cost oQC and the incentive correction QE ∂∂∂ b/
2
0  affect 
the pricing of access and that of good 1 in qualitatively equivalent ways. 
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Equations (5) and (6) give the first order conditions for the effort levels under 
asymmetric information.  The formulas are extended with an incentive 
correction term.  This term is equal to zero for the most efficient type.  The 
correction term will also disappear if we assume that the sub cost functions 
supports the dichotomy condition. 
 
To sum up, the optimal regulatory policy under asymmetric information is 
given by: 
 
• Equation (3) and (7) gives the optimal prices for every type 
( ) ( ) ,**1 bbb "aandp  
 
• Equation (5) and (6) gives the optimal effort for every type 
( ) ( ) bbb "*1*0 eande , 
 
• Substituting these optimal variables, into the cost functions we get the 
optimal cost levels for every type 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )bbbbbb *2*12*2*11*0*0 ,,,, ppqppqeC + , 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) bbbbb "*2*11*1*1 ,,, ppqeC   
 
• The utility level for every type is then given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,}{)()(( 10*1*0* bbb
b
b
b
bbyb
b
b
"
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+¢-= Ú d
EE
eeU  
 
• The net transfer for every type is finally given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) bbbbbbybb "++-= *2*12**1*0** , ppqaeeUt  
 
2.5 A budget balanced model 
When the government is prohibited from making transfers to the regulated 
firm, the regulators will maximise social welfare subject to a budget balance 
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constraint.  The shadow price of funding is now type contigent ( )bl .   The 
optimal pricing and effort levels are changed as follows 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )blblll +Æ+ 1/1/   the Ramsey term (pricing) 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )bbl
l
l
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b
f
dxxfx
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Ú
11
  the incentive corr. term (pricing/effort) 
 
In particular the access pricing equation (7) becomes 
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Note the similarities between this model and the model with government 
transfer.  The network imposes fixed costs which cannot be financed by 
nondistortive lump sum taxes.  By charging an access price above marginal 
cost, the financial burden of the regulator or the price distortion associated with 
the firms budget constraint are reduced. 
 
On the other side, by giving up one regulatory instrument, the regulation 
becomes more complex and more inefficient as the regulator tries to use only 
access prices in order to meet various market structure goals. 
  
 
3 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
So far I have assumed the existence of a group of competitive firms in the retail 
market.  The access price has then been set to achieve allocative efficiency.  
What happens when the regulator is also concerned with inducing proper entry 
(productive efficiency) and the only tool available to the regulator is the access 
price? 
  
Ideally, the change in the social welfare due to a new competitor should be 
internalized in the competitors objective function.  The competitor would then 
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enter the market only if his investments and operating costs were less than the 
positive change in social welfare.  The regulatory mechanism could include 
Ramsey prices to secure allocational efficiency and a subsidy that  reflected the 
change in consumer surplus.   
 
Alternatively, if the competitor does not face any fixed entrant and the cost 
functions are according to the dichotomy conditions, the regulator should set 
prices equal to the Ramsey price formulas developed in subsection 2.4 and 2.5.   
  
Baumol (1993) has proposed a simple access pricing rule called the Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR). According to market contestability theory 
the access charge should be set equal to the cost of access plus the incumbent’s 
foregone profit caused by supplying a unit of access to its rivals17.   
 
(9) ( ) 111111010 / qCcwherecpcCpCa QQ ∂∂=-=--+=  
 
I will now compare ECPR with the normative pricing rules derived in section 
2.4 and 2.5 assuming balanced budget.  Like before, I assume that gas supply 
from the monopoly and from the competitive fringe can be treated like 
imperfect substitutes.  I will make use of the following sub cost functions  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 111111111
2100021000
/
/
qCeHcwhereqeHC
qqCeHcwhereqqeHC o
=-≡-=
+=-≡+-=
bb
bb
 
which implies constant marginal costs and that the dichotomy property hold.  
 
The regulator maximises the expected social welfare subject to constraint (9), 
the incentives constraint and the balanced budget constraint.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )bbybb 10 eeUt ++=  can be interpreted as the firm’s manager’s 
                                                
17 See Baumol (1993): ”If a component of a product is offered by a single supplier who also 
competes with others in offering the remaining product component, the single-supplier 
component’s price should cover its incremental cost plus the opportunity cost incurred when a 
rival supplies the final product”. 
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compensation and ( ) ( ) ( ) ceHpp +--= 1112 bbb  as a result of competition in 
the retail market and applying the ECP rule.   
 
Figure 8 
Optimization program III: Asymmetric information, no transfer and ECP 
access pricing rule. 
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The resulting ECPR is given in equation (10) and should be compared to the 
optimal rule in equation (11).  
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I will now compare the two pricing rules under different assumptions on 
marginal costs and demand. 
 
Case I: Symmetric demands and costs:  
In this case 21 ˆˆ hh =  and cc =1 . The equality of the superelasticities implies 
that the Lerner indexes for good 1 and good 2 will be identical.  Furthermore, 
the assumption of symmetric costs and competitive pricing implies equality of 
prices, so that  
 
11221 cpcpaandpp -=-==  .   
 
The normative pricing rules yield the same result as the ECP rule. 
  
Case II:  Linear demands, symmetric costs and captive customers. 
I now assume that the monopoly has captive customers while competitors do 
not.  This might be the case if the owner of the natural gas pipeline make long 
term take-or-pay contracts with customers in the retail market to avoid the 
hold-up problem discussed in section 1, while new entrants like f.ex. Gasnor 
involves in short-term contracts.   
 
The assumptions in this case are  
cc
and
aaandbdwithdpbpaq
dpbpaq
=
<<+-=
+-=
1
121222
2111
, 
 
where 12 aa <  reflects that a higher part of the demand for the monopoly’s 
good 1 is not responsive to price changes.   Optimal pricing formulas now yield 
 
11221 cpcpaandpp -<-=>  
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The monopoly should optimally charge a higher prices than its competitors 
because a higher part of their demand is not price sensitive.  The high mark-up 
on good 1 is then used as a subsidy on access charges. 
 
Case III: Linear symmetric demands, cost superiority of monopoly. 
Finally, I make use of the same demand functions as in case II except for 
21 aa = .  Furthermore I assume that cc <1 .  The optimal pricing formulas now 
yield 
 
11221 cpcpaandpp -<-=<  
 
In this case the price differential in the retail market will only partially reflect 
the cost differential in producing good 1.  The access price should optimally be 
set lower than the ECP rule to absorb the rest. 
 
To sum up: under reasonable assumptions about the cost functions and the 
demand functions, the ECPR will in many situations suggest access prices that 
are higher than the normative pricing model.     
 
4 Concluding remarks 
In this paper I have tried to give a rather detailed description of the regulatory 
context for a new gas infrastructure in Norway.  On this background I have 
presented an access pricing model developed by Laffont and Tirole (1994) and 
investigated how this model compares with ECPR developed by Baumol 
(1993).  The model is developed for the Telecommunication sector, but seems 
to fit rather well with the regulatory context for gas infrastructure. My main 
objections to the application of this model is however: 
 
• For a producer of natural gas there exists an outside opportunity to use 
the gas pipeline.  Lets assume that the a gas company like Gasnor can 
choose between buying natural gas and transport it trough Lyse Gass’ 
pipelines or transforming the natural gas to LNG and transport it by 
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ship. The model should be altered to reflect this fact, by including a 
bypass mechanism in the model. 
     
• The model does not include the producers profit function in the social 
welfare function.  This can be acceptable if the producers are mainly 
foreigners and we set the weight on their profit equal to zero.  
Alternatively, if I assume a competitive market for sale of gas at the 
beachheads and a cost structure characterized by constant marginal 
costs, competition will result in zero profit.   
 
•  Finally, in this model I have treated natural gas supplied by the 
regulated firm (good 1) as an imperfect substitute to natural gas 
supplied by its unregulated competitors.  Natural Gas is to a large 
extent a homogenous commodity with the required quality specified in 
the contracts.  The differentiation of the products must then be due to 
different terms in the contracts and/or deliverance reliability18.   
 
In my further research I will try to develop an access pricing model for a 
vertically integrated gas company which competes with a competitive fringe in 
the downstream market and which competes with the LNG infrastructure in the 
upstream market.  In doing so, I will model the competition in the producers 
market explicitly, and discuss to what extent the natural gas contracts can be 
viewed as close substitutes. 
                                                
18 This way of thinking is supported by Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) who says: 
“Since gas is a relatively homogenous commodity, price competition in supply is likely to be 
strong.  Suppliers can, however, offer differentiated contracts to customers with variations in 
the degree of pass-through and in the extent of seasonal pricing.  
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 APPENDIX A 
The regulator will maximise the sum of consumer surplus, taxpayers surplus 
and firms utility subject to the monopoly’s IRC and the competitive fringe’s 
pricing behaviour.  
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Solving for optimal prices we have to take correctly account of the 
interdependencies between the two products in the demand functions.  Noting 
that ii pqS =∂∂ /  we get 
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These two equations can be rewritten using matrix notations 
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or by Cramer’s rule 
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A symmetric expression can be obtained for 2L . 
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APPENDIX B 
Under asymmetric information we find the optimal regulation from 
maximisation , subject to (3) and (4), of expected social welfare 
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Here we have assumed: 
• Concave S and convex sub cost functions 
• SOC of truthful revealing is satisfied  
 
I solve the optimisation problem using control theory.  Let ( )bm be the  co state 
variable, ( )bU the state variable and 102,1 , eandepp the control variables, we 
can set the Hamiltonian equal to  
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In optimum the following conditions must hold 
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Noting that the Hamiltonian is concave in 1021 ,,, eandeppU , condition (a) 
and (b) is necessary and sufficient condition for optimum.  The resulting 
control variable are dependent on type and is given by equation (d) – (g).  
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Finally I will rewrite condition (f) and (g) using kC  as the control variable 
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APPENDIX C 
Under asymmetric information both the first order and the second order 
condition for the firm’s maximisation problem should be satisfied when 
evaluated at bb =~ .  The second order condition for truthful revelation is given 
by 
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I assume the following sub cost functions 
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Both sub cost functions can be inverted since they are monotonically 
increasing in 1,0=- iforeib .  Assuming the net transfer includes the access 
charge, the utility of the regulated firm can then be rewritten 
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The second order condition of incentive compatibility is then. 
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A necessary condition for optimum is then that the sum of effort is 
nonincreasing with type, or equivalently that the sum of average cost is  
nondecreasing with type. 
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